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Political Illiberalism:
The Paradox of Disenfranchisement and
the Ambivalences of Rawlsian Justice
Jesse Furman
Are there, perhaps, advantages which not only don't fit, but cannot be
fitted, into any classification? ... So that a man who would, for
instance, openly and knowingly choose to act in opposition to this
whole scheme would ... be an obscurantist or a complete madman,
wouldn't he? Yet there is something astonishing about this: how is it
that, in calculating man's advantages, all these statisticians, sages, and
humanitarians invariably omit one of them?
-Fyodor Dostoevsky'
[T]hey say we should not humanise the inhuman. But the point is they
are not inhuman ... and it is in their humanity that we must locate
our collective guilt, humanity's guilt for human beings' misdeeds; for
if they are just monsters-if it is just a question of King Kong and
Godzilla wreaking havoc until the aeroplanes bring them down-then
the rest of us are excused.
-Salman Rushdie2
The right to vote is arguably the most important totem of democratic
citizenship. Groups throughout American history, from women to African
Americans to the poor, have struggled to achieve the full membership in the
political community that the franchise grants. The Supreme Court has declared
that the right to vote is an "inalienable right," debasement of which makes one
"that much less a citizen." 3 Yet despite its putative commitment to the
inalienability of voting, the Supreme Court has, in fact, upheld the forfeiture
of voting rights by a large number of American citizens:- In fourteen states,
1. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND 22-23 (Mirra Ginsburg trans.. Bantam Books
1974) (1864).
2. SALMAN RUSHDIE, THE MOOR'S LAST SIGH 297 (1995).
3. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565. 567 (1964).
4. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24. 41-56 (1974) (upholding discnfranchiscmnit of fclons).
1197
The Yale Law Journal
persons convicted of a felony are disenfranchised for life.5
The Supreme Court's approval of felon disenfranchisement, in the context
of its jurisprudence on voting and citizenship, presents a paradox: While it has
held that voting is essentially equivalent to citizenship, 6 and that citizenship
cannot be taken away as a form of punishment, 7 the Court has failed to close
the syllogistic circle. The outcome is an uneasy tension, or ambivalence,
between a rhetoric of toleration as expressed in the Court's citizenship
jurisprudence and a discourse of exclusion as expressed in its approval of
disenfranchisement.
In this Note, I attempt to untangle this paradox. My contention is not that
the Supreme Court has simply fallen prey to a logical inconsistency that is
easily remedied. The paradox of disenfranchisement, I argue, is a reflection of
a much deeper inconsistency-an ambivalence deep within modem liberalism's
normative ideals.
To examine these ideals, it is necessary to dig deeper than the legal
opinions on disenfranchisement themselves; it is necessary to consider the
political theory on which our liberal self-understandings are based. My
analysis, therefore, is premised on an examination of the theoretical work of
the most prominent and celebrated modem liberal thinker, "arguably 'the
greatest [political] philosopher of our century,"' 8 John Rawls. 9 My aim is to
show that Rawls's theory of justice, "justice as fairness,"'" is characterized
by the same ambivalence as that in the paradox of disenfranchisement, between
toleration and exclusion. Indeed, this ambivalence lies at the very heart of
liberalism as it is currently formulated." For while consent-the linchpin of
5. See infra note 125. Conservative estimates indicate that there are as many as fifty million convicts
in the United States, of whom almost fourteen million have been convicted of a felony. Of these fourteen
million citizens, many have lost the right to vote. See Velmer S. Burton, Jr. et al., The Collateral
Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Statutes, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1987,
at 52, 52; Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights
Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE LJ. 537, 540 n.17 (1993) (estimating that there are four million
disenfranchised criminals and ex-offenders).
6. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964); see also infra notes 110-24 and accompanying
text.
7. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1967); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958)
(plurality opinion); see also infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
8. Linda R. Hirshman, Is the Original Position Inherently Male-Superior?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1860,
1861 (1994) (misquoting Brian Barry, Good for Us, but Notfor Them, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 14, 1993,
at 23).
9. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM];
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE].
10. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 11.
11. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that Rawlsian liberalism is the only version of liberal theory,
or even that it is somehow representative of all liberal theories. I focus on Rawls for two reasons. First,
his philosophy bears a closer relationship to American liberalism than perhaps any other. See infra notes
13-17 and accompanying text. Second, he places more explicit emphasis on the goal of achieving toleration
than many other liberal theorists, see, e.g., RAwLs, POLmCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 10 ("[P]olitical
liberalism applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself."), so an accusation of intolerance or
exclusion against his theory has more significance. All liberal theorists are committed to the principle of
toleration in some respect, but "comprehensive" liberals (to use Rawls's term)-like Ronald Dworkin or
[Vol. 106: 11971198
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liberalism-arguably provides the most secure basis for toleration, it also has
a significant drawback: In the search for consensus, it is virtually inevitable
that some will be excluded.'
2
If such exclusion is truly inevitable, as I argue in this Note, the test of a
liberal regime and its laws is only in part how exclusionary they are; the
process through which they exclude, how permanent their exclusions are, and
how they treat the excluded, are all of primary importance. From this
perspective, I contend, the liberal natures both of Rawls's theory and of
American law are jeopardized. For in both cases, consensuality and its
exclusions are privileged over a more liberal form of toleration: In the case of
American criminal law this privilege is illustrated by the practice of
disenfranchisement; and in the case of Rawls's "justice as fairness" it
manifests itself as a potent punitive tendency in his account of a stable, well-
ordered society.
My argument does not rest on the claim that theory and practice are
coterminous; nor, for that matter, does it rely on an assertion that Rawls's
ideals are our ideals. Rather, my more modest claim is that Rawls's liberal
Robert Nozick-and "perfectionist" liberals-like Joseph Raz-givc pnonty to other values, like "'equal
concern and respect." see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIoUsLY 272-78 (1977). the ability to
"shap[e one's] life in accordance with some overall plan." see ROBERT NOZICK. ANARCHY. STATE. AND
UTOPIA 50 (1974), or autonomy, see JOSEPH RAZ. THE MORALITY OF FREEDO.% 425 (1986) In doing so.
I would argue, these theorists fall prey to even more significant problems of exclusion than does Rawls
For a critique of comprehensive liberalism and perfectionist liberalism along these and other lines. see
William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism. 105 ETICS 516. 523-24 (1995). Charles Lamore.
Political Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 339. 342-46 (1990); and Chantal Mouffe. Political Liberalism-
Neutrality and the Political. 7 RATIO JURIS 314, 323 (1994). In discussing disenfranchisement in Part I1.
I expand my analysis beyond Rawls's theory to explore the phenomenon of exclusion in the philosophical
traditions of social contract theory and republicanism generally. See infra notes 155-78 and accompanying
text.
12. For other observations and criticisms of the exclusionary nature of modern liberal theory and
politics, see WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, IDENTfTY\DFFERENCE: DFIOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL
PARADOX (1991); THOMAS L. DUMM, DEMIOCRACY AND PUNISHMENT DISCIPLINARY ORIGINS OF THE
UNITED STATES (1987); BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEE.N7T or- POLITICS (1993);
J. DONALD MOON, CONSTRUCTING COMMUNITY (1993); and Mouffe. supra note II. My argument in this
Note draws on each of these theorists' work, especially that of Bonnie Honig. see mfra Pan 1. but it also
differs in key ways. First, to a greater or lesser extent, each of these theonsts argues for the abandonment
of traditional liberal theories. See, e.g., CONNOLLY, supra, at 80 (calling for notion of polittcs called
"agonistic democracy," embodying extreme politicization of identity); DUitm, supra. at 152 (calling for new
"rhetoric of freedom, one grounded in a new right, a right to fear"); MOON. supra. at 8 (rejecting traditional
conceptions of liberalism, including Rawls's, for his own "political liberalism"). In contrast, the premise
of my argument is that Rawlsian liberalism itself can provide a secure foundation for a more tolerant, and
less exclusive, version of liberalism. Where the above critics see only exclusion. I see ambivalence. Thus,
while Rawls's reliance on consensus leads to exclusion, justice as fairness simultaneously provides the
resources with which to overcome this reliance. The task. I argue, is to shift the theory so as to pnvilege
toleration over consensus, rather than the reverse. See infra Par I11.
The second way in which my analysis differs from those of the above critics is in its effort to explore
the dynamics of exclusion not only in liberal theory but in liberal politics as well. through the "paradox
of disenfranchisement." At least one other scholar has attempted to look at the role of felon
disenfranchisement in American society, see Note, The Disenfranchisement of Er-Felons: Citzetuhip.
Criminality, and "The Purity of the Ballot Box", 102 HARV. L. REv. 1300 (1989). and our analyses overlap
in a number of ways. There are, however, crucial differences between that author's conclusions and my
own. See infra note 179.
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political philosophy is the theory most closely aligned with the way we live
and view ourselves in America today; his ideals reflect and inform those ideals
that American institutions attempt to fulfill. 3
I am not the only one to hold this view of Rawls's stature. Indeed, Rawls
has been cited in scores of legal opinions, more than perhaps any other
contemporary political theorist. 14 In 1973, his first book, A Theory of Justice,
was awarded the prestigious Coif Award by the Association of American Law
Schools for the best "law book" written in the preceding three years. 5 In
addition, other political theorists are quick to acknowledge Rawls's influence
on American thought and politics: "For us in late twentieth century America,"
Michael Sandel writes, "[Rawls's liberal vision] is our vision, the theory most
thoroughly embodied in the practices and institutions most central to our public
life. ' 16 Or as Alan Ryan puts it: "Mr. Rawls' ideas have crept into the law of
the land."' 7 In any event, while there are surely differences between
American politics and Rawlsian ideals, those differences are secondary for my
purposes: I focus on the correspondence between theory and practice rather
than the gaps.
Since my analysis of the paradox of disenfranchisement builds on my
examination of the ambivalences inherent in liberal political theory, I begin in
Part I by looking at Rawls's theory of justice, particularly as it appears in
Political Liberalism. In this, his latest work, Rawls proposes a series of
reformulations and reinterpretations of his original theory, designed principally
to improve upon its claim to secure suitable grounds of toleration. The theory's
very foundations, however, continue to favor consensuality over toleration, so
that even in its new form, I maintain, these foundations undermine the tolerant
nature of justice as fairness. After identifying the nature of the toleration-
exclusion ambivalence in liberal theory, I shift focus in Part II to American
criminal law and the paradox of disenfranchisement. The paradox, I argue,
13. In a constitutional democracy like the United States, the relationship between theory and practice
is particularly close when one looks beyond day-to-day politics and (in Rawls's words) "ordinary law" to
focus on matters of constitutional import and "higher law." See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note
9, at 231; see also infra Part II. The line between theory and practice in such cases-in legal opinions on
constitutional matters, for instance-while not invisible, is certainly blurred.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 2 MJ. 834, 838 (A.C.M.R. 1976) (Costello, J., concurring) (citing
Rawls's view of punishment in well-ordered society as support for affirming criminal sentence); Barnes
v. Tools & Machinery Builders, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 518, 523-24 (Mo. 1986) (Donnelly, J., dissenting)
(quoting at length from Rawls in products liability case); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364. 1368
n.4 (Nev. 1987) (citing Rawls in support of tort judgment); see also Peter F. Lake, Liberalism Within the
Limits of the Reasonable Alone: Developments of John Rawls' Political Philosophy, Its Political Positivism,
and the Limits on Its Applicability, 19 VT. L. REV. 603, 603 n.2 (1995) (citing over 40 cases in which
Rawls has been invoked).
15. See Richard B. Parker, The Jurisprudential Uses of John Rawls, in NOMOS XX:
CONSTITUrIONALISM 269, 269 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979).
16. Michael 1. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81, 82
(1984); see also id. ("[Siecing how [Rawls's philosophy] goes wrong as philosophy may help us to
diagnose our present political condition.").
17. Alan Ryan, How Liberalism, Politics Come to Terms, WASH. TIMES, May 16, 1993, at B8.
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exposes the true cost of the ambivalence-the potential for illiberal practices
to coexist with liberal principles-and demonstrates that American liberalism,
like its Rawlsian relation, possesses strong illiberal tendencies. The Part
concludes that disenfranchisement laws, though perhaps constitutional, should
be repealed. Finally, in Part III, I conclude with an argument for a
reconfigured conception of liberalism, for a shift away from the privilege of
consensuality to a more "liberal" privilege of toleration."
1. JOHN RAWLS AND THE AMBIVALENCES OF JUSTICE
Rawls's argument on behalf of justice as fairness, as it appears in both A
Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, can be roughly divided into two
stages. In the first stage, where he develops the normative theory itself, Rawls
introduces a hypothetical initial situation, the "original position," incorporating
certain procedural constraints designed to produce agreement on principles of
justice. In the second stage, he attempts to illustrate how the two principles
agreed upon in the original position define a workable conception of justice
that approximates and improves upon our considered judgments. It is in this
stage of his argument that Rawls considers the issue of stability and attempts
to compose a picture of a well-ordered society regulated by justice as fairness.
It is also here that the exclusionary element of the theory emerges. Since this
is the consequence of features in the normative theory, however, I begin with
an examination of the first stage.
A. From Consensus to Closure: Rawls's Normative Argument
As with all social contract views, Rawls's theory of justice as fairness
works from a concept of agreement. The intuitive appeal of this starting point
lies in the liberal notion that cooperation ought to be based on individuals'
consent and ought to be for their mutual benefit.'9 Yet it would be virtually,
if not actually, impossible to find principles of justice on which all individuals
in society, with their radically differing conceptions of the good, could agree.
Herein lies the role of Rawls's original position, a "purely hypothetical
18. In urging Rawlsian liberalism further toward toleration, my aim is to make the theory lic up to
its own ideals and commitments and to those of liberalism generally. As Rawls himself notes, liberalism
and toleration are closely linked, both historically and conceptually. See RA.VLS. PoLrnCAL LIBE.,Lsm.
supra note 9, at xxii-xxvii; see also Will Kymlicka, Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance. 13 ANALYSE
& KRMK 33, 33-34 (1992) (arguing that modem liberalism is closely linked to individual-bascd vtew of
toleration). Indeed, toleration is, in Will Kymlicka's words, a "'cardinal liberal vtnue " WILL KYIUCKA.
LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 9 (1989).
19. See generally Samuel Freeman, Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Vi s. 19 P IL & PUB
AFF. 122 (1990) (discussing role of consent in social contract theories).
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situation" constructed so as to insure that the principles of justice agreed to are
the "result of a fair agreement or bargain. 20
Rawls's original position is a specially designed choice situation intended
to guarantee the "desired solution."' 2' The grounds of choice are severely
restricted 22 to ensure that the parties will reach identical conclusions on the
fundamental principles of justice. Indeed, as a number of commentators have
noted, the original position is less a situation of bargain or agreement than one
of acknowledgment or acceptance. 23  Although a bargain or agreement
presupposes a degree of difference between the parties, in the original
position-where the parties are required to reach a unanimous decision-"the
deliberations of any one person are typical of all."2 4 The two principles of
justice as fairness are, in Rawls's words, the "only choice"' 5 that the parties
can make: "It must make no difference when one takes up [the original
position's] viewpoint, or who does so: the restrictions must be such that the
same principles are always chosen."
26
The unanimity requirement and the guarantee of perfect repetition combine
to ensure that the principles chosen in the original position are foreclosed to
further consideration or revision;27 the demand for consensus leads to closure.
If upon lifting the veil of ignorance, therefore, a party to the agreement finds
that the principles of justice as fairness are not congruent with his or her
conception of the good, the fault is placed squarely on his or her shoulders and
he or she cannot complain. Upon taking up the "perspective" of the original
position, such a subject will recognize the "truth" of justice as fairness and will
20. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 12.
21. Id. at 141. The "desired solution" is the now famous two principles ofjustice as fairness: first, that
each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of basic liberties, including the
right to vote; and second, that economic inequalities are to be arranged for the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged. Priority is given to the first principle, so that greater social or economic advantages can neither
justify nor compensate for a deviation from institutions of equal liberty. See id. at 60-61, 302; RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 5-6, 291.
22. The parties in the original position are mutually disinterested, rational, and know very little about
themselves or their society. The parties know that they have some conception of the good and they know
that the "circumstances ofjustice"-a conflict of interests and moderate scarcity-hold in their society. All
other knowledge of their particular circumstances, including their places in society, their class or social
status, their fortunes in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, their sex, race, religion, and ethnicity,
is covered by a "veil of ignorance" on the grounds that it is "irrelevant from the standpoint of justice,"
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 18-19. To give the parties in the original position some
theory of the good on the basis of which to deliberate, Rawls develops a "thin" theory based on a set of
primary goods that it is "supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants." Id. at 92; see also
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 308-09.
23. See, e.g., HONIG, supra note 12, at 132-33; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS
OF JUSTICE 128-32 (1982); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 101 (1990).
Rawls himself writes that "the parties have no basis for bargaining in the usual sense." RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 139.
24. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 263. A number of critics, notably feminists, have
taken issue with Rawls's exclusion of multiple perspectives from the original position. See, e.g., SUSAN
MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 89-109 (1989); Hirshman, supra note 8, at 1860-97.
25. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 121.
26. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
27. See HONIG, supra note 12, at 135-36.
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be compelled to alter his or her self-understanding to fit neatly within its
restrictions. 2' The source of dissonance in society, according to this view, lies
completely in the individual, not in the conditions of agreement or the
principles chosen. Political action and resistance are displaced by introspection
and self-adjustment.29
There are moments in A Theory of Justice when Rawls himself appears to
recognize the implications of his emphasis on consensus and to retreat from
this extreme view. For instance, his notion of "reflective equilibrium"-the
mutual adjustment of principles and considered judgments about
justice-suggests that he leaves some room for alteration of the principles after
lifting the veil of ignorance.30 In addition, the principles are not applied
directly to society from the original position. Instead, Rawls posits a "four-
stage sequence" (the original position, constitutional convention, legislative
stage, and the application of rules to particular cases by judges and
administrators), in which the principles are applied to progressively smaller
aspects of society.3 In each successive stage, the veil of ignorance gets
thinner until it finally disappears in the fourth stage, a progression which
suggests that political space for disagreement is gradually expanded until it is
opened completely.
But these moments are ultimately overshadowed by the rest of Rawls's
argument. Since the original position is to be interpreted so as to guarantee
perfect repetition, reflective equilibrium cannot involve the mutual adjustment
of principles and considered judgments; after all, once they are agreed upon
the principles cannot be changed. Any need for adjustment, therefore, will
demand the alteration of judgments to fit the principles; the burden of
congruence is again on the individual. Though the veil of ignorance does
become thinner in each stage of the four-stage sequence, political space does
not expand accordingly. While citizens gain new information on which to base
their opinions in each successive stage, the contests and agreements of the
previous stage are closed and rendered inaccessible to challenge or
reformulation. Moreover, as the veil of ignorance grows weaker with each
passing stage, the constraints of the reasonable grow stronger.' 2 As a result,
in the final stage, where disagreement and contestation might have appeared,
politics is construed simply as administration and maintenance; a vigorous
28. As I discuss infra in text accompanying notes 38-40, Rawls no longer justfies political liberalism
on the basis of truth, but relies on reasonableness instead. But see Robert Justin Lipkmn. In Defense of
Outlaws: Liberalism and the Role of Reasonableness, Public Reason. and Tolerance in Multicultural
Constitutionalism, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 284-5 (1996) (arguing that Rawls still relies on truth, though
"camouflage[d" by reasonableness).
29. For a similar observation, see HONIG, supra note 12, at 136-37.
30. See Stephen Mulhall, Reply to Alain Boyer on "Democracy and Disagreement". 8 RATIO JLRIS
9, 9-10 (1995).
31. See RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 195-201.
32. See RAwLs, POULTICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 340.
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citizenry, instead of being taken as the sign of democratic vitality, is seen as
an indication of injustice and instability.
The original position, however, is not the source of the ambivalence
between closure and openness-as Bonnie Honig, for example, seems to
suggest in her analysis of justice as fairness.33 The original position is, after
all, only a device of representation; its ambivalences simply model the
ambivalences of that which it represents. To locate the source of the
ambivalence in Rawls's theory, therefore, one must go deeper than the original
position and analyze the very foundations of his project. Rawls makes these
foundations clear in his discussion of the idea of the reasonable in Political
Liberalism.
Rawls's principal aim in Political Liberalism is to specify a "political
conception of justice"-" given the "fact of reasonable pluralism":35 the fact
that a democratic society is characterized "not simply by a pluralism of
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism
of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines."36 The political
conception is conceived as the focus of an "overlapping consensus" of these
differing comprehensive doctrines. In formulating his argument, Rawls applies
the idea of the reasonable "to various subjects: conceptions and principles,
judgments and grounds, persons and institutions. ' 37 In fact, Rawls relies on
the idea of the reasonable almost entirely, forgoing claims to truth.3' The
political conception of justice "does not criticize ... [comprehensive] accounts
of the truth of moral judgments and of their validity. Reasonableness is its
standard of correctness . . . ,,31 It is "the idea of the reasonable [that] makes
an overlapping consensus ... possible. 40 What, then, is the content of the
reasonable?
Rather than directly define the idea of the reasonable, Rawls describes its
two basic aspects as virtues of persons.4' According to the first aspect,
33. See HONIG, supra note 12, at 131-37. Honig argues that the effectiveness of the original position
lies in its drift "from a contractual situation, to a perspectival position ... to a self-ordering mantra." Id.
at 132. As I have suggested, see supra text accompanying notes 27-32, 1 do not think that the original
position moves cleanly from any one formulation to another; ambivalence characterizes its very structure.
34. RAWLS, POLMCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at xvi.
35. Id. at xvii.
36. Id. at xvi. A comprehensive doctrine, Rawls explains, "includes conceptions of what is of value
in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and character, that are to inform much of our nonpolitical
conduct (in the limit our life as a whole)." Id. at 175.
37. Id. at 94.
38. Cf. Paul F. Campos, Secular Fundamentalism, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1814, 1820 (1994) (arguing
that, "for Rawls, 'reason' and 'reasonable' fill the lexical space that in many other discourses would be
filled by 'God,' or 'the scriptures,' or 'moral insight"').
39. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 127. But see supra note 28.
40. RAWLS, POLMCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 94.
41. For an extensive consideration of Rawls's idea of the reasonable, see Lipkin, supra note 28, at
279-302. See also Miriam Galston, Rawlsian Dualism and the Autonomy of Political Thought, 94 COLUM.
L. REv. 1842, 1846-48 (1994) (discussing Rawls's idea of the reasonable and its connection to political
principle of toleration); Gary C. Leedes, Rawls's Excessively Secular Political Conception, 27 U. RICH. L.
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[p]ersons are reasonable... when, among equals say, they are ready
to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and
to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will
likewise do so. Those norms they view as reasonable for everyone to
accept and therefore as justifiable to them ....
The second basic aspect of the reasonable is "the willingness to recognize the
burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of public
reason in directing the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional
regime. 4 3 "[M]any of our most important judgments," Rawls writes, "are
made under conditions where it is not to be expected that conscientious
persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will all arrive
at the same conclusion.""
According to Rawls, the idea of the original position embodies the two
aspects of the reasonable. Its result, the political conception of justice, is
therefore reasonable itself. The two aspects, however, are in moderate tension.
Whereas the first aspect-the willingness to propose principles on which all
can agree-supports the idea that there are such norms, the second aspect-the
willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment-establishes the realization
that persons will often end up in disagreement.
It is the idea of the reasonable, therefore, which underlies the ambivalence
in the original position between consensus and its exclusions on the one hand
and toleration on the other. The first aspect of the reasonable, agreement on
fair terms of social cooperation, is at the foundation of the theory's emphasis
on consensus and closure. In positing that there are norms that are "reasonable
for everyone to accept,"4 5 this aspect underlies the search for principles to
which citizens should adjust themselves. In contrast, the second aspect of the
reasonable, recognition of the burdens of judgment, establishes that citizens
will not always agree and that they may not be forced to do so. This is the
foundation of the theory's emphasis on toleration and space for reasonable
disagreement. While the first aspect of the reasonable informs the theory's
emphasis on consensus, however, it does not inherently require such
consensus: The search for reasonable principles does not alone require that
people agree to them. When taken too far, however, the first aspect functions
as if consensus were required. The original position, faced with a unanimity
REv. 1083, 1091-95 (1993) (arguing that Rawls's idea of the reasonable does not adcquatcl) deal with
problem of motivation).
42. RAWLs., POLMCAL LIBERALISM. supra note 9, at 49.
43. Id. at 54. By burdens of judgment Rawls means the "sources. or causes, of disagreement bctccn
reasonable persons so defined," including conflicting or complex evidence, the indeterminacy of concepts
and the consequent reliance on interpretation, and different citizens' total experiences See id at 55 For
a more comprehensive list, see id. at 56-57.
44. Id. at 58.
45. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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requirement and structured so that there is not even the possibility of
disagreement, takes the first aspect of the reasonable to this consensual
extreme. The result is that justice as fairness, even in its narrower incarnation
in Political Liberalism as a political conception of justice, privileges exclusion
over space.
At first glance, this conclusion seems counterintuitive. After all, in
Political Liberalism, consensus is no longer demanded on a comprehensive
doctrine46 but only on a political one: Citizens "individually decide for
themselves in what way the public political conception all affirm is related to
their own more comprehensive views." 47 No longer is justice as fairness
presented as the sole possible outcome of an original position of equality; there
are, Rawls writes, "many liberalisms. '48 "It is inevitable and often desirable
that citizens have different views as to the most appropriate political
conception [of justice] .... An orderly contest between them over time is a
reliable way to find which one, if any, is most reasonable.
49
Upon closer analysis, however, it is apparent that exclusion still reigns.
Since the principles are the outcome of a procedure considered reasonable,
disagreement with them can be nothing other than unreasonable;50 as in A
Theory of Justice, dissonant subjects need only take up the "perspective" of the
original position in order to realize that the fault for incongruence lies in their
own self-understandings. 51 Indeed, at the core of political liberalism's
overlapping consensus is a conception of justice with which all are required
to identify. While political liberalism does not impose "the unrealistic-indeed,
the utopian-requirement that all citizens affirm the same comprehensive
doctrine," it does require that citizens affirm "the same public conception of
justice. 52  Though Rawls calls this conception "political, 53  and
"freestanding," ' it must nevertheless at least be consistent with citizens' self-
understandings as informed by their comprehensive conceptions. 55 Thus,
while Rawls tries to minimize the degree of consensus necessary for a well-
46. For definition of a comprehensive doctrine, see supra note 36.
47. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 38.
48. Id. at 223.
49. Id. at 227.
50. See Campos, supra note 38, at 1826; Galston, supra note 41, at 1859; Lipkin, supra note 28, at
300.
51. Though it is only "a device of representation," Rawls writes, "the idea of the original position
serves as a means of public reflection and self-clarification." RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note
9, at 26 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 39.
53. Id. at 10.
54. Id.
55. See Galston, supra note 41, at 1849-51; Lipkin, supra note 28, at 289; see also Elizabeth H.
Wolgast, The Demands of Public Reason, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1936, 1941-42 (1994) (questioning belief
that reasonableness is separable from comprehensive doctrine).
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ordered society, the political conception still establishes a mandatory self-
understanding to which all citizens must subscribe.56
Rawls is untroubled that this self-understanding is mandatory because he
bases it on a normative conception of the person. A society regulated by a
public political conception of justice, Rawls argues, should "elicit an effective
desire" on the part of persons to conform to-and also to be seen as
conforming to-the "ideal of citizenship"5' by being reasonable, rational, free
and equal persons.5 9 Individuals as reasonable persons "are not moved by the
general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which they,
as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept." 60 In a
well-ordered society regulated by justice as fairness, in other words,
individuals should desire on their own to realize the "ideal of citizenship."
But what if this presumption does not hold? Is it "reasonable," even, to
expect it to hold? Since Rawls considers only ideal theory, he is not fully
equipped to answer either of these questions. 6I Nonetheless, there are
moments when he acknowledges the inevitability of dissonance, as when he
discusses criminals and those who hold unreasonable or irrational
comprehensive doctrines. How then does justice as fairness respond to such
dissonance? What does it have to say to those who fail to subscribe to the
ideal of citizenship or to those who fail to acknowledge the principles of
justice as reasonable principles that all should accept? In order to answer these
questions, it is necessary to look at the second stage of Rawls's argument, at
the application to society of the two principles agreed upon in the original
position. The emphasis on consensus over toleration found in Rawls's
normative argument, I argue in the next Section, is the cause of a powerful
punitive tendency that manifests itself in his account of a stable, well-ordered
society. This tendency undermines the claim that justice as fairness is a truly
tolerant conception.
56. Cf Mouffe, supra note 11, at 321-22 (discussing exclusionary elements of political liberalism)
57. For an explication of Rawls's conception of the person. see Frank 1. Mchelman. The Subject of
Liberalism, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1807, 1818-20 (1994) (book review). See also WILLIAM A. GALSTON.,
LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERsrrY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 118-39 (1991) (cnticizing
Rawls's conception of the person).
58. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9. at 71.
59. See i at 71, 81.
60. Id. at 50.
61. While Rawls presumes strict compliance with his pnnciples of justice and considers almost
exclusively issues of ideal theory, I base much of my argument on an application of his ideal theory to
nonideal circumstances. There are two reasons for this. First, an essential part of my argument is that
Rawls's failure to consider partial compliance theory is one of the weaknesses in his account of justice as
fairness. Cf. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9. at 575 (acknowledging lack of theory of
punishment as weakness). On the rare occasions when he does consider it (for example. the few pages of
A Theory of Justice devoted to discussion of punishment). Rawls fails to grasp the problems raised for his
ideal theory. Second, the test of any ideal theory is how well it can explain and withstand the complexities
of a nonideal world, that of everyday life.
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B. The Fact of Dissonance and Punishment as a Stabilizing Device
In the previous Section, I demonstrated the way in which Rawls's
normative theory embodies a fundamental ambivalence between toleration on
the one hand and exclusion on the other. This ambivalence is rooted in
Rawls's conception of the reasonable, the first aspect of which lies behind the
search for consensus, and the second aspect of which lies behind the
recognition of difference. Due to structural elements of the theory, like the
original position's unanimity requirement and the assumption of strict
compliance, the first aspect is privileged over the second. In this Section, I
explore the consequences of this privileging. In particular, I argue that it leads
Rawls to rely on punishment as a stabilizing device in a way that he himself
defines as illiberal.62
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls founds stability solely on the wager that
citizens governed by nearly just institutions will suffer few if any "strains of
commitment" and that they will acquire a "corresponding sense of justice."63
In such a society, Rawls argues, there would be little if any punishment, since
criminality would rarely, if ever, surface: "[M]en's propensity to injustice is
not a permanent aspect of community life; it is greater or less depending in
large part on social institutions, and in particular on whether these are just or
unjust. A well-ordered society tends to eliminate or at least to control men's
inclinations to injustice . . . ."64 Stability, in this instance, presupposes what
Rawls calls congruence---congruence between individuals' conceptions of the
good and the institutions of a well-ordered society governed by the two
principles of justice. The desire to act in accordance with these institutions,
Rawls writes, is equivalent to "the desire to express our nature as free moral
persons. 65
This idea of stability as congruence appears again in Political Liberalism
(along with a greater emphasis on the reasonable), only now it is supplemented
by Rawls's idea of an overlapping consensus between reasonable yet
incompatible comprehensive doctrines.66 In Political Liberalism, however,
62. My analysis in this Section of the punitive tendency in the second stage of Rawls's theory bears
many similarities to Bonnie Honig's analysis, see HONIG, supra note 12, with two principal differences.
First, she considers justice as fairness only in the context of A Theory of Justice (even though the ideas
contained in Political Liberalism had appeared in essays prior to Honig's writing). Her analysis, therefore,
does not take into account Rawls's revised version of stability or, for that matter, the introduction of his
idea of the reasonable. More importantly, Honig does not identify an ambivalence in Rawls's theory; she
sees only exclusion where I also see the possibility of toleration. It is on the basis of this ambivalence, I
believe, that the liberal nature of justice as fairness can be redeemed. See infra Part Ill.
63. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 177.
64. Id. at 245. Rawls does think that even ideal theory should provide an account of a "public system
of penalties." Id. at 240. The purpose of this system, however, is not to punish violations of the law (in
ideal theory, after all, there are no violations of the law) but rather to solve an assurance problem. See id.
65. Id. at 572.
66. See George Klosko, Rawls's Argument from Political Stability, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1882, 1883-89
(1994) (contrasting views of stability in A Theory of Justice with views in Political Liberalism).
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Rawls also presents two ways in which a political conception of justice may
approach the issue of stability. In the first view, stability is seen as a "purely
practical matter":
67
[I]f a conception fails to be stable, it is futile to try to realize it.
Perhaps we think there are two separate tasks: one is to work out a
political conception that seems sound, or reasonable, at least to us; the
other is to find ways to bring others who reject it also to share it; or
failing that, to act in accordance with it, if need be prompted by
penalties enforced by state power. As long as the means of persuasion
or enforcement can be found, the conception is viewed as stable."
But, Rawls continues, "as a liberal conception, justice as fairness is concerned
with stability in a different way."' 6 9 It "aims at being acceptable to citizens as
reasonable and rational, as well as free and equal, and so as addressed to their
public reason .... If justice as fairness were not expressly designed to gain the
reasoned support of citizens who affirm reasonable although conflicting
comprehensive doctrines," Rawls writes, "it would not be liberal."70 He goes
on:
The point, then, is that the problem of stability is not that of
bringing others who reject a conception to share it, or to act in
accordance with it, by workable sanctions, if necessary, as if the task
were to find ways to impose that conception once we are convinced
it is sound. Rather, justice as fairness is not reasonable in the first
place unless in a suitable way it can win its support by addressing
each citizen's reason .... 7
Although Rawls demands less from his citizens in Political Liberalism, he
nevertheless continues to base the stability of his order on the wager that "just"
institutions will offer "sufficient motivation of the appropriate kind" for
citizens to comply voluntarily with the principles of justice.72
The problem with this wager is that Rawls himself admits that it is a bad
bet. The account of stability that Rawls favors as liberal is, after all, only
addressed to "citizens who affirm reasonable although conflicting
comprehensive doctrines." 73 The definition of a reasonable comprehensive
doctrine is one that allows it to affirm the political conception of justice. Yet,
as Rawls notes throughout his book, society is filled not only with reasonable
67. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9. at 142.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 142-43.
73. Id. at 143.
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and rational citizens, but with their opposites as well. The "fact of reasonable
pluralism," as Rawls calls it, characterizes only part of democratic society;
taken as a whole, a democratic society is actually characterized by the broader
fact of pluralism.74 The existence of "unreasonable and irrational, and even
mad, comprehensive doctrines,"7 5 Rawls admits, "is itself a permanent fact
of life, or seems so.,,76
With the inevitability of individuals holding such doctrines, what might be
called (following Rawls's own terminology) "the fact of dissonance," Rawls's
emphasis on consensus becomes significantly problematic. Given his
acknowledgment of the inevitability of dissonance, it would make sense for
Rawls to revert back to the idea of the reasonable, appealing this time,
however, to its second aspect, which emphasizes toleration.77 Recognizing
that dissonant citizens are as much a part of a society regulated by justice as
fairness as those who comply, the second aspect of the reasonable would seem
to demand that justice as fairness recognize at least a minimal debt to these
individuals: a recognition that the content of justice as fairness is as much the
cause of dissonance as is the behavior or self-understanding of the individuals
in question.78
Yet Rawls fails to revert back to the aspect of the reasonable which
supports toleration. Instead, he continues to emphasize consensus and chooses
not even to address justice as fairness to the individuals who fail to accept it.
"In their case," he writes, "the problem is to contain them so that they do not
undermine the unity and justice of society. '79 Rawls calls this task of
containment "practical" and he compares it to the containment of war and
disease. 0 When extended to include the fact of pluralism rather than simply
the fact of reasonable pluralism, therefore, Rawls's account of stability in
justice as fairness bears a striking resemblance to the "purely practical"
account that he disavowed as illiberal. Society, Rawls had explained, has "two
separate tasks" according to the purely practical view of stability: "one is to
work out a political conception that seems sound, or reasonable, at least to us;
the other is to find ways to bring others who reject it also to share it...
or ... to act in accordance with it, if need be prompted by penalties .... 81
74. See Galston, supra note 11, at 518-19 (criticizing Rawls for focusing on fact of reasonable
pluralism rather than fact of pluralism).
75. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at xvi-xvii.
76. Id. at 64 n.19.
77. It is important to note that the second aspect of the reasonable is itself biascd toward exclusion
in that Rawls defines the burdens of judgment as the "sources, or causes, of disagreement between
reasonable persons so defined." Id. at 55 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying note 43.
78. Cf. CONNOLLY, supra note 12, at 80 (arguing that modem liberals fail to acknowledge cruelty in
forcing human beings to conform to liberal conception of individual because liberals
presume-wrongly-that humans do so naturally).
79. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at xvii.
80. See id. at 64 n.19.
81. Id. at 142 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
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It may be argued in response that unreasonable persons or criminals are
not themselves motivated by liberal principles and that justice as fairness
therefore owes them nothing. However, such an objection applies to the
conception of justice, particularly to the principle of legitimacy, only one
aspect of the idea of the reasonable: that favoring consensus. In viewing the
principles of justice as fairness and the principle of legitimacy as reasonable
on that basis alone, the citizens of a well-ordered society are entirely justified
in using "coercive power backed by the government's use of sanctions" against
those who do not fit. 2 Defined as "reasonable," the citizens of justice as
fairness are licensed to deal with these dissonant individuals, without remorse
or doubt, in ways that would otherwise be inconsistent with justice as fairness
as a liberal conception-by containing, excluding, or punishing them to enforce
compliance. Since the), are unreasonable, this treatment is by definition
reasonable.
8 3
This displacement can be seen clearly in Rawls's description of criminal
law in A Theory of Justice.g' The purpose of criminal law, he writes,
is to uphold basic natural duties .... [Criminal law is] not simply a
scheme of taxes and burdens designed to put a price on certain forms
of conduct and in this way to guide men's conduct for mutual
advantage. It would be far better if the acts proscribed by penal
statutes were never done. Thus a propensity to commit such acts is a
mark of bad character, and in a just society legal punishments will
only fall upon those who display these faults. 5
Although punishment is inflicted only on those who commit criminal actions,
its justification is based on the "bad" character of the individual who commits
them; while it is action that is punished, it is character that is criminalized.
Once an individual has committed a crime, his or her character becomes, in
Honig's words, a "thoroughly juridical concern" 5 -- or, to put it in Rawls's
82. RAWLS, POLMCAL LIBERALISM. supra note 9, at 136.
83. See Mouffe, supra note II. at 321-22.
84. Rawls does not consider the institutions of punishment and criminal law in Political Lberuhm
For a discussion of punishment in a Rawlsian liberal state, see Jean Hampton. Retribution and the Liberal
State, 1994 J. CONTEmP. LEGAL ISSUES 117, 132-35.
85. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE. supra note 9. at 314-15 (emphasts added) (footnote omitted)
86. Some critics, notably Honig and Sandel, argue that passages like the one quoted above contradict
Rawls's earlier rejection of moral desert. See HONIG. supra note 12. at 138-39; SANDEL. sUpra note 23.
at 82-90. As Honig writes, "From Rawls's perspective, the bad character is so bedildenngly deviant that
Rawls is forced back into a discourse he disavowed: the discourme of antecedent moral %orth" HONIG.
supra note 12, at 138. 1 do not believe that this criticism is correct. The moral %onh that Rawls rejects is
antecedent: It is based on criteria outside of or prior to the selection of a conception of justice. The
judgment of moral worth at issue in the case of criminals is not antecedent in the scnsc that it is determined
after the selection of principles of justice, not before. Honig and Sandel seem to be suggesting that Rawls's
rejection of desert means justice as fairness may not make moral judgments about individuals at all; this
is clearly not the case and simply weakens Rawls's theory unnecessarily.
87. HONIG, supra note 12. at 139.
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own words, the criminal becomes a "medical or psychiatric" case "to be
treated accordingly.
88
Faced with the fact of pluralism (the pluralism of both reasonable and
unreasonable comprehensive doctrines) and the inevitability of "bad characters"
(individuals who reject arguments on behalf of the principles of justice as
fairness), Rawls is forced to consider the justice of "requiring [those for whom
affirmation of their sense of justice is not a good] to comply with just
institutions. 8 9 "[U]nder what conditions," Rawls asks, "would the persons in
the original position agree that stabilizing penal devices can be employed?" 90
Rawls answers unequivocally that citizens of justice as fairness may force
dissonant individuals to comply with the principles of justice, and may exercise
this power without any remorse, doubt, or ambivalence. Not only do the
citizens' own senses of justice and emphases on maintenance and stability
justify such action, but in addition, those "who find that being disposed to act
justly is not a good for them cannot deny" the rationality or the reasonableness
of their own punishment.9
Perversely enough, therefore, the dissonant individuals themselves are
considered participants in their own treatment or punishment. Indeed, this
insight forms the basis of a brief critique of social contract theory by the
French philosopher Michel Foucault: "In effect the offense opposes an
individual to the entire social body; in order to punish him, society has the
right to oppose him in its entirety. It is an unequal struggle: on one side are
all the forces, all the power, all the rights." 92 The criminal in such
circumstances faces a penalty that "seems to be without bounds," while
because he is a part of the social body that is bound by the contract, he cannot
object-he wills his own punishment. 93
The consequences for justice as fairness are profound: All elements of
doubt and ambivalence having been removed from the exercise of penal power,
there is arguably no maximum level of societal punishment beyond which the
citizens of justice as fairness will doubt the reasonableness or the justice of
their institutions.94 Rawls himself writes:
88. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 185 (discussing those with incapacitating tastes
and preferences).
89. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 575.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 576.
92. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 90 (Alan Sheridan trans.,
1979). In shifting the right to punish from the sovereign to the defense of society, Foucault argues, social
contract theory had aimed to limit and control the possible exercise of coercive power. See id. But
paradoxically, it achieved just the opposite: The right to punish "finds itself recombined with elements so
strong that it becomes almost more to be feared.... It [becomes] a terrible 'super power."' Id.
93. See id.
94. For an observation of this phenomenon in the context of American politics, see infra note 183.
If there is a maximum level of punishment in Rawls's society, it is extremely high: It must threaten the
compliant citizens' own senses of liberty or be of excessive cost. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra
note 9, at 240-41 ("The establishment of a coercive agency is rational only if these disadvantages are less
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It can even happen that there are many who do not find a sense of
justice for their good; but if so, the forces making for stability are
weaker. Under such conditions penal devices will play a much larger
role in the social system. The greater the lack of congruence, the
greater the likelihood, other things equal, of instability with its
attendant evils. Yet none of this nullifies the collective rationality of
the principles of justice .. . . [The choice of the principles
[therefore] ...need not be reconsidered.95
It is easy to imagine such citizens abusing the power they are granted as
members of a constitutional regime, namely "the power of free and equal
citizens as a collective body."" Considering the seamless justification they
have been given for using such power to guarantee compliance, they would
hardly recognize it as power at all.
Rawls is not altogether blind to the exclusions in his theory. He recognizes
that the ideal of citizenship and the two principles of justice as fairness are
normative constructions and that they "impose restrictions": "[T]he basic
institutions [that the] principles require," he writes, "inevitably encourage some
ways of life and discourage others, or even exclude them altogether." 7 Yet
Rawls resigns himself to this inevitability by declaring that "'[no society can
include within itself all forms of life .... [T]here is no social world without
loss. ' 98 While conceding that for dissonant individuals, "[it is, of course, true
that ... just arrangements do not fully answer to their nature, and therefore,
other things equal, they will be less happy," Rawls concludes, in a most telling
turn of phrase, "here one can only say: their nature is their inisfortune."',
Thus it seems that justice as fairness is voluntary and liberal only up to a
point: only for those whose self-understandings would have them voluntarily
comply with it in the first place,'o° or whose self-understandings are easily
adaptable to the mandatory self-understandings prescribed by justice as
fairness. For all others, Rawls can only say: "Your nature is your
misfortune." '' m
than the loss of liberty from instability."). The reasonableness of such a system is conspicuously absent as
a consideration.
95. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 576 (emphasis added) Bascd on his argument
in Political Liberalism, Rawls would call incorrect an appeal that solely referred to the "collective
rationality of the principles." See RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERAUSM. supra note 9. at 53 n 7 This does not
affect my immediate point, however, which is that the principles. sshate cr their origin. ssould not be
reconsidered even in the face of a reliance on widespread punishment to enforce stability For a kindred
observation, see HONIG, supra note 12, at 144.
96. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 136-37 (discussing "'liberal pnnciple of
legitimacy").
97. Id. at 195.
98. Id. at 197.
99. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUST1CE supra note 9. at 576 (emphasis added).
100. Cf. Heidi M. Hurd, The Levitation of Liberalism, 105 YALE LJ. 795. 819 (1995) (book re,,iew)
(criticizing Rawls for preaching to converted and excluding those who hold *'unreasonable** siesss).
101. As Honig rightly concludes: "Rawls comes as close as he ever does to admitting that justice as
fairness is built on an ineliminable moment of arbitrariness: some will feel at home. completed and realized
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C. Rawls's Political Illiberalism
In sum, Rawls's failure to incorporate into his theory what I have termed
the fact of dissonance makes him unaware of his reliance on punishment to
maintain the stability of justice as fairness. The citizens of justice as fairness,
defined as reasonable based on their congruence with the principles of justice,
are licensed to deal with those who lack such congruence in ways that Rawls
himself defines as illiberal: by punishing or excluding them. The fault for
dissonance having been displaced solely onto the shoulders of these individual
"bad characters," the citizens of justice as fairness avoid introspection into
their own exercises of power, whether normative or penal.
The ultimate point is not that Rawls is wrong in assuming that social
worlds have limited space but rather that his resignation is illiberal.' 12 For
indeed, as I argued at the outset of this Note, given the limited space of social
worlds, the test of a liberal regime should extend to the process of exclusion,
this exclusion's permanence, and how the regime treats those it excludes.
Subjected to such a test, the liberal credentials of Rawls's theory are severely
challenged. Its emphasis on consensus at the normative level results in a
punitive tendency that undermines the basis of the theory as a liberal political
conception and impairs its potential for radical toleration. Instead of a duty to
engage in dialogue, Rawls provides the "reasonable" citizens of justice as
fairness with only the task of containment, making sure that "dissonant"
individuals do not pose a threat to the stability of their norms. The result is a
regime inclined toward limiting political space and curbing contestation: When
a threat is perceived, Rawls licenses his citizens to respond with the stabilizing
device of punishment. 10 3 To the individuals receiving punishment, his
citizens can only say: "Your nature is your misfortune."
II. "THE PARADOX OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT" AND THE AMBIVALENCES OF
AMERICAN PENAL JUSTICE
Having identified the ambivalence within liberal political theory between
toleration on the one hand and closure or exclusion on the other, I now return
to American practice and the paradox of disenfranchisement. The paradoxical
nature of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence reflects an ambivalence in
American legal and political life similar to that in Rawls's theory of justice in
by the constructions of justice as fairness, and others will not." HONIG, supra note 12, at 141.
102. Cf. Mouffe, supra note 11, at 322 ("No state or political order, even a liberal one, can exist
without some form of exclusion .... But it is very important to acknowledge those forms of exclusion for
what they are and the violence that they imply, instead of concealing them under the guise of rationality.").
103. The punitive tendency in justice as fairness belies a fundamental insecurity in the theory: If "just
institutions" truly offered "sufficient motivation of the appropriate kind" for persons to comply voluntarily,
as Rawls argues, the stabilization of society through punishment would be unnecessary. See RAwLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 142-43.
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Part I.4 The inalienability of citizenship manifests the toleration prong of
this ambivalence, while the approval of disenfranchisement evidences the
power of the exclusionary element.
I begin this Part with an elaboration of the judicial paradox of
disenfranchisement itself, based primarily on legal opinions (although I
consider elements of Rawls's theory when the issues I discuss parallel
elements of justice as fairness).'05 After discussing the paradox, I then review
the conventional explanations-both practical and philosophical-for the
practice of disenfranchisement. I argue that these putative explanations, far
from resolving the paradox, actually deepen it, justifying illiberal practices in
an otherwise liberal order. Finally, I end with a reconsideration of justice as
fairness, illustrating the parallels between the ambivalence in Rawls's theory
and that behind the paradox of disenfranchisement.
A. The Right to Vote and the Paradox of Disenfranchisement
It may be recalled from Part I that the first principle of justice as fairness
is that each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system
of basic liberties.'06 This principle is defined as prior to the second principle,
meaning that greater social or economic advantages can neither justify nor
compensate for a deviation from the institutions of equal liberty. In Political
Liberalism, Rawls elaborates on the first principle by adding that "the equal
political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair
value."'07 This guarantee, he argues, means that the "worth of the political
liberties to all citizens ... must be approximately equal, or at least sufficiently
equal, in the sense that everyone has a fair opportunity to hold public office
and to influence the outcome of political decisions. ' s Principal among all
the basic liberties, therefore, are the political liberties; principal among the
political liberties is the right to vote. As Rawls writes in A Theory of Justice:
"[A]II citizens are to have an equal right to take part in, and to determine the
104. My argument is not that Rawls supports disenfranchisement; in fact. he does not mention it at
all. See infra note 109. Rather, it is first that the ambivalence in Rawls's theory can be seen in American
law, and second that this ambivalence permits actions like disenfranchisement that are contradictory with
other elements of both Rawls's theory and American liberalism, including the strict protection of basic
rights and liberties.
105. I focus in this Part on the case of permanent disenfranchisement, not disenfranchisement during
time spent in prison. Citizens in 47 states lose the right to vote while serving time for a felony conviction.
whereas felons lose the right to vote permanently in only 14 states. See mifra note 125. My analysis could
easily extend to the case of disenfranchisement in prison, but the loss of one's voting rights for life makes
the issues I am discussing clearer. For a discussion of voting rights while in prison, see generally Shapiro.
supra note 5.
106. See supra note 21.
107. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERAUSM. supra note 9. at 5 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 327.
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outcome of, the constitutional process that establishes the laws with which they
are to comply."' 9
As in Rawls's scheme, the right to vote has been interpreted in American
political and legal discourse as one of the most fundamental rights of
democratic citizenship. Judith Shklar, in her short work entitled American
Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion, cites voting as one of only two rights that
constitute the value of American citizenship: "To be a recognized and active
citizen at all," she writes, one "must be an equal member of the polity, a
voter."'' f In the words of Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, the right to
vote "is the sacred and most important instrument of democracy.'''
What is so important about political rights, and the right to vote in
particular? Rawls offers two reasons for their priority. First, the political
liberties are "essential ... to make sure that the fair political process specified
by the constitution is open to everyone on a basis of rough equality. ' j 2
Second, they are crucial "in order to establish just legislation.""' 3 As a result,
"it is not implausible that these liberties alone should receive the special
guarantee of fair value. This guarantee is a natural focal point between merely
formal liberty on the one side and some kind of wider guarantee for all basic
liberties on the other."'"14 This argument is based principally on pragmatic
concerns: Political liberties are crucial because they provide access to the
process that determines the value of all the basic liberties.
The Supreme Court has relied on this pragmatic argument in many of its
decisions involving the franchise. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 15 for example, the
Court noted that the right to vote is "fundamental" because it is "preservative
of all rights."' I 6 In Wesberry v. Sanders,'1 7 it held (in language like
Rawls's): "No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a
voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
109. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 221. If Rawls has an opinion on
disenfranchisement, this passage suggests that it is in opposition to the practice. On the other hand, at
another point in A Theory of Justice, Rawls writes that "[a]ll sane adults, with certain generally recognized
exceptions, have the right to take part in political affairs." Id. at 222 (emphasis added). Rawls does not
specify the exceptions but it is not inconceivable that criminals are among them. In any event, as I have
mentioned, Rawls's actual views on disenfranchisement are incidental to my analysis. See supra note 104.
It is more than enough to point out that his relevant views are ambiguous.
110. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 64 (1991). The other
right that Shklar cites is eaming. See id. at 63-101.
111. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 250 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (arguing that state
constitutional provision, providing that legislature select governor from two candidates receiving most votes
where no candidate receives majority, violates Equal Protection Clause).
112. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 330.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 329.
115. 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding city ordinance unconstitutional where official is empowered to deny
arbitrarily permission to conduct lawful business).
116. Id. at 370.
117. 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that disparity among congressional districts presents justiciable claim
under Fourteenth Amendment).
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citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the
right to vote is undermined."" 8
The priority of the right to vote can, however, be justified in an even more
fundamental way, one which connects the right directly to citizenship itself.
Shklar presents such a view in her book on American citizenship, in which she
focuses on citizenship as "social standing."'2 9 The right to vote is essential,
in her view, because it establishes one's status as an equal citizen in a
democracy. It is the franchise, she points out, that those excluded from
citizenship (principally black slaves) demanded more than any other right:
"The ballot has always been a certificate of full membership in society, and its
value depends primarily on its capacity to confer a minimum of social
dignity."'12 1 Indeed, while he does not make the relationship explicit, Rawls
allows for a similar connection between voting and citizenship, based on "the
fundamental importance of self-respect."' 2' Self-respect, Rawls writes, "is
rooted in our self-confidence as a fully cooperating member of society capable
of pursuing a worthwhile conception of the good."'- It is "secured," he
argues, "by the public affirmation of the status of equal citizenship for all," a
status guaranteed by the fair value of the political liberties.
Whether it is justified instrumentally or intrinsically, it is clear that the
right to vote is a central component, if not the central component, of
democratic citizenship. History has also confirmed this conclusion: Legislatures
and courts in the United States have gradually extended the right to vote to
virtually all groups previously denied the suffrage.'2 ' Yet, despite the
theoretical and historical priority of voting, there remains a class of otherwise
eligible American citizens who cannot vote: In fourteen states, persons who
have committed felonies are disenfranchised for life.'2 Disenfranchisement
118. Id. at 17.
119. SHKLAR, supra note 110, at 2.
120. Id.; see also Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting. 68 N.Y.U L. R-% 330 (1993) 4arguing
for view of voting as meaningful participatory act as opposed to "'instrumental" vie% cpou-d b) Supreme
Court).
121. RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9. at 318
122. Id.
123. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9. at 545 (emphasis added). One adantage of this
over the pragmatic justification is its emphasis on the importance of the right to vote rather than of its
exercise. The pragmatic justification does not account adequately for the fact that so many citizens regularly
fail to vote. See SHKLAR, supra note 10, at 27 ("It was the denial of the suffrage that made the right
to vote such a mark of social standing .... [O]nce one possessed the nght. it conferred no other personal
advantages. Not the exercise, only the right, signified deeply.").
124. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV (granting blacks right to vote); id. amend. XIX (granting
women right to vote); id. amend. XXIV (prohibiting poll tax in federal elections). id. amend. XXVI
(granting 18-year-olds right to vote); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (prohibiting
poll tax in state elections).
125. The states that continue disenfranchisement are: Alabama (AL.A. CONST art VIII. § 182). Arizona
(ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 2; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-912(a). 16-101(a)(5) (Wvest 1989)). Florida (FLA-
CONST. art. VI, § 4; FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 944.292 (Harrison 1991)). Iowa (IowA COST ant. § 5).
Kentucky (Ky. CONST. § 145). Maryland (MD. CONST. art. I. § 4; MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957 art 33. §§ 3-4
(1993)), Mississippi (MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241), Nevada (NEV. CONST. art 11. § 1). Nev, Mexico (N M
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laws in these states vary widely. Whereas in some, conviction for a felony
automatically results in disenfranchisement, in others, conviction for any one
of a number of enumerated offenses or conviction for an "infamous crime"
leads to disenfranchisement.126 Whether and how an ex-felon's right to vote
can be restored also varies depending on the state.
27
The Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of these laws on
only a few occasions, most recently in the 1985 case Hunter v.
Underwood.128  Although the Court in Hunter struck down the "moral
turpitude" section of Alabama's 1901 disenfranchisement law, it did so only
because the law's original intent was to prevent blacks from voting;'2 9 the
Court explicitly declined to reconsider earlier decisions which found the actual
practice of disenfranchising ex-felons to be constitutional. 30 In its most
direct consideration of the issue, the Court upheld a California statute
disenfranchising ex-felons in Richardson v. Ramirez,'31 basing its decision
on a rarely cited clause in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment that
explicitly mentions the disenfranchisement of those convicted of crimes .
32
In neither case did the Court offer a justification for disenfranchisement or
consider the practice's theoretical implications; the Court focused instead on
the narrow question presented of whether or not disenfranchisement is
permissible under the Constitution.
133
CONST. art. VII, § 1), Tennessee (TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5; TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-143 (1985). § 40-20-
112 (1990)), Utah (UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6), Virginia (VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-42
(Michie 1985)), Washington (WASH. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 3), and Wyoming (WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-106
(Michie 1977)).
126. In addition to losing the right to vote, those convicted of crimes suffer a whole range of other
civil disabilities, from the right to serve on a jury, to the right to hold public office, to parental rights.
These laws vary widely from state to state (in no state is the number of disabilities zero) as do the
procedures by which one's rights are restored. In some, rights are automatically restored after prison, parole
or probation while in others restoration comes only after explicit pardon by the governor or state legislature.
See OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE
SURVEY (1992); Burton et al., supra note 5, at 54-58.
127. See Burton et al., supra note 5, at 54-55.
128. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
129. See id. at 229-32.
130. See id. at 233.
131. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
132. Id. at 41-56. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in relevant part: "[W]hen the right
to vote . . . is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
133. Arguments have been made that the Court's decision in Richardson is flawed on the constitutional
question itself. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Mr: Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV.
293, 303 (1976) ("[Tjhere is not a word in the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment suggesting that the exemptions
in section two's formula are in any way a barrier to the judicial application of section one in voting rights
cases, whether or not they involve the rights of ex-convicts."). Disenfranchisement has also been criticized
on Eighth Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Gary L. Reback, Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: A
Reassessment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 845, 858-60 (1973). The constitutional question is secondary for my




If this were all that the Supreme Court had to say about issues related to
disenfranchisement, then the matter would be interesting but straightforward.
This is not, however, all that the Court has had to say. Many of its other
rulings-on the issues of voting and citizenship, for example-make its stance
on disenfranchisement paradoxical and contradictory.
Beginning with voting, the Court throughout its history has drawn an
explicit connection between the franchise and citizenship. The franchise, the
Court has held, is the ultimate right of citizenship: It is a symbolic and
tangible demonstration of one's full membership in the national political
community.' 3 Indeed, although resident aliens, for instance, are granted
almost all the rights of citizenship under the Constitution,"5 they are
excluded completely from a whole set of rights guaranteed in the document:
political rights. 36 Chief among these rights is the right to vote. Chief Justice
Earl Warren, for example, wrote in Reynolds v. Simst37 that it is a citizen's
"inalienable right" to participate in elections138 and debasement of that right
makes one "that much less a citizen."'139 Similarly, in Dunn v. Bhitnstein,"°
the Court commented that "a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to
participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens. '
While the Court has drawn a direct connection between voting and
citizenship, it has also held that citizenship is, for all intents and purposes, an
inalienable right that cannot be taken away as a form of punishment. The
Court first enunciated this rule in Trop v. Dulles,'4"2 in which a native-born
American was stripped of his citizenship and declared stateless for wartime
134. In 1875, the Supi ne Court did actually reject the claim, made on behalf of %omcn, that '.oting
was connected to citizenship. See Minor v. Happersett. 88 U.S. (21 wall.) 162 (I875) The Court stated
that the "Constitution, when it conferred citizenship, did not necessarily confer the right of suffrage." Id,
at 177. This conclusion flowed from the "separate sphere" argument regarding women's correct place in
society: Motherhood, not political participation, was thought to be the appropriate activity of a ssoman- This
confirms the thesis that suffrage is the sign of membership in the political community. women %,cre not
extended the right to vote because they were not considered to be a part of that community See Sandra
Day O'Connor, The History of the lbmen's Suffrage Afovement. 49 VAND. L REv 657, 658 (1996)-
Jennifer K. Brown, Note, The Nineteenth Amendment and Women's Equality. 102 YALE L-. 2175. 2178-81
(1993). Furthermore, Minor is in conflict with Er parne Yarbrough. also known as the Ku Klux Klan Cases,
which "made it clear that the right to vote ... is a privilege of national citizenship derived from the
Constitution." United States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. 250 F Supp. 330. 353 tE-D La.
1965) (citing Ex parte Yarbrough, I10 U.S. 651 (1884)).
135. See, e.g., Sam Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d 745. 749 (9th Cir. 1972) ("Any person sithin
the United States, citizen or alien, resident or non-resident, is protected by the guarantees of the
Constitution.").
136. At one point during the nineteenth century. 22 states or temtones actually did grant the right to
vote to aliens, a practice that continued in some places until 1926. See Jamin B. Raskin. Legal Aliens. Local
Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage. 141 U PA L REV
1391, 1397-417 (1993).
137. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
138. Id. at 565.
139. Id. at 567.
140. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
141. Id. at 336.
142. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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desertion.143 Writing for a plurality of the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren
declared such denationalization unconstitutional as a violation of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.' The Chief Justice
wrote:
Citizenship is not a license that expires upon misbehavior...
[C]itizenship is not lost every time a duty of citizenship is shirked.
And the deprivation of citizenship is not a weapon that the
Government may use to express its displeasure at a citizen's conduct,
however reprehensible that conduct may be. As long as a person does
not voluntarily renounce or abandon his citizenship ... his
fundamental right of citizenship is secure....
[Denationalization constitutes a] total destruction of the
individual's status in organized society. It is a form of punishment
more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the
political existence that was centuries in the development.
45
Nine years later, in a case involving a naturalized citizen who lost his
citizenship for voting in a foreign election, the Court extended its rule,
prohibiting denationalization through any means other than voluntary
renunciation. 46 These cases are motivated by the view that citizenship cannot
be taken away because it forms the basis of one's status as a free and equal
person in democratic society.
Taken on their own, the Court's rulings on disenfranchisement, voting, and
citizenship do not raise significant questions. But taken together, the
jurisprudence seems incoherent: The Court's rulings, as a whole, present a
flawed syllogism. Roughly speaking, voting is equivalent to citizenship;
citizenship, in turn, is inalienable; but, for some reason, voting is not
inalienable. A equals B equals C, but C does not equal A. This is the paradox
of disenfranchisement.
The two competing elements of this paradox are parallel to the two aspects
of the ambivalence in Rawls's theory of justice. While disenfranchisement is
the outcome of a desire for the maintenance of consensus (those who violate
the terms of social cooperation are excluded or contained so as not to threaten
143. Id. at 87 (plurality opinion). Trop had been gone for less than one day and willingly surrendered
when met by an army vehicle while walking back in the direction of his station. See id. at 87-88 (plurality
opinion).
144. See id. at 101 (plurality opinion). In dicta, the Court distinguished denationalization from
disenfranchisement on the ground that the latter is permissible as a "nonpenal exercise of the power to
regulate the franchise." Id. at 97 (plurality opinion) (citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Murphy
v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885)).
145. Id. at 92-101 (plurality opinion).
146. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1967). This rule extends only to citizenship
procured lawfully; naturalization obtained through fraud or other illegal means may be stripped. See Id. at
267 n.23; Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 673-74 (1946).
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the "consensus" of the others), the inalienability of citizenship follows from a
commitment to radical toleration (no matter what act a person commits,
"however reprehensible,"' 47 his or her status as an equal member of society
is secure).
B. (Un)Justifying Disenfranchisement
The parallel between the actual practice of disenfranchisement and the
treatment of dissonant individuals in Rawls's theory is more striking when one
considers the theoretical underpinnings of disenfranchisement. Analyzing the
offered philosophical justifications helps to connect the practice of
disenfranchisement to the treatment of criminals and other dissonant
individuals in justice as fairness. In both cases, the emphasis of penality is on
the individual nature of crime and criminality, shielding the overall order from
reconsideration or doubt. This emphasis is what allows a practice like
disenfranchisement to persist despite its fundamental inconsistency with the
aspect of American political discourse protecting basic rights.
Before considering the philosophical justifications of disenfranchisement
it is necessary to examine the two commonly offered pragmatic arguments on
behalf of the practice. The first such practical justification is the fear that ex-
convicts will use their votes inappropriately to influence elements of criminal
law. As Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit wrote in Green v. Board of
Elections: 48
[I]t can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that
perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the
legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the
prosecutors who must try them for further violations, or the judges
who are to consider their cases.'49
The second common practical justification, cited by the court in Kronhuld v.
Honstehi,' 50 is the state's "interest in preserving the integrity of her electoral
process," which might include protecting against the possibility of voter fraud,
"by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-social behavior
whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims."''
Neither of these justifications withstands close scrutiny.'" It is unlikely
that ex-convicts would differ from the average voter and make decisions based
147. See supra text accompanying note 145.
148. 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967).
149. Id. at 451.
150. 327 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
151. Id. at 73.
152. For similar criticisms of the policy justfications for disenfmnchisement. ,cc Note, supru note 12.
at 1302-03.
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on any single criterion, let alone on the content of the criminal law. Moreover,
given the relatively small proportion of the electorate that is ex-convicts, any
influence on the administration of criminal law that they might have would be
negligible. 53 As to the risk of voter fraud, there is no reason to believe that
modem technology for voter registration and laws specifically dealing with
voter fraud are insufficient to protect against the tampering that
disenfranchisement is ostensibly intended to prevent.'
54
The two philosophical justifications for disenfranchisement, each of which
appeals to a longstanding tradition of political philosophy, are more revealing
and complex than the practical ones. t'5 The first draws directly on the social
contract tradition; the second, on the tradition of civic republicanism. In an
example of the former, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit wrote:
A state properly has an interest in excluding from the franchise
persons who have manifested a fundamental antipathy to the criminal
laws of the state or of the nation by violating those laws sufficiently
important to be classified felonies .... [S]uch persons have breached
the social contract and, like insane persons, have raised questions
about their ability to vote responsibly.
56
In some instances, appeal is made directly to the forefathers of social contract
theory themselves. In Green, for example, Judge Friendly appealed directly to
John Locke:
The early exclusion of felons from the franchise by many states could
well have rested on Locke's concept, so influential at the time, that
by entering into society every man "authorizes the society, or which
is all one, the legislature thereof, to make laws for him as the public
good of the society shall require, to the execution whereof his own
assistance (as to his own decrees) is due."'
15 7
Following from this premise, the decision asserts: "A man who breaks the laws
he has authorized his agent to make for his own governance could fairly have
153. This justification is also constitutionally questionable given the Supreme Court decision in
Carrington v. Rash, which declared that .'fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population
because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible." 380 U.S. 89,94 (1965); see also Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 355-56 (1972).
154. Cf. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[D]isenfranchisement provisions are patently both overinclusive and underinclusive. The provision is not
limited to those who have demonstrated a marked propensity for abusing the ballot by violating election
laws.").
155. For a detailed elaboration of the two philosophical arguments used to justify disenfranchisement,
see Note, supra note 12, at 1304-09.
156. Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
157. Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY
CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 9j 89 (1698)).
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been thought to have abandoned the right to participate in further administering
the compact."'
5
In relying on contract theory to justify disenfranchisement, courts have
emphasized the deliberate nature of the offender's action. As the court in
Wesley v. Collins159 wrote: "Felons are not disenfranchised based on any
immutable characteristic, such as race, but on their conscious decision to
commit an act for which they assume the risks of detection and
punishment."'' The commission of a crime is interpreted as a declaration by
the individual of his or her rejection of the terms of the social contract. The
criminal becomes, in Foucault's words, "the common enemy": "Indeed, he is
worse than an enemy, for it is from within society that he delivers his
blows-he is nothing less than a traitor, a 'monster.""161 Subsequently, the
criminal loses all claims to the contract: "How could society not have an
absolute right over him?"'162 Or as Locke writes, "[1f a citizen] disclaim the
lawful Government of the Country he was born in, he must also quit the Right
that belong'd to him by the Laws of it ....163
Curiously, even as courts continue to cite social contract theory, they no
longer apply the doctrine to its logical extreme. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in On
the Social Contract, indicates what such an extreme would be:
[E]very offender who attacks the social right becomes through his
crimes a rebel and traitor to his homeland; he ceases to be one of its
members by violating its laws, and he even wages war against it....
[H-le has broken the social treaty, and consequently is no longer a
member of the State.'64
If a criminal by his or her action is no longer considered a member of the
state, he or she should consequently lose all rights, not a select few. At one
point in American history, this was in fact the case. As late as the late
nineteenth century, courts held that a prisoner was for all intents and purposes
a slave of the state.165 Today, however, courts no longer hold such a view.
158. Id.
159. 605 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
160. Id. at 813 (emphasis added).
161. FOUCAULT, supra note 92, at 90.
162. Id.
163. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATSES OF GOvERNMENT 394 (Peter Laslett ed.. Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690).
164. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 65 (Roger D. Masters cd. & Judith R
Masters trans., St. Martin's Press 1978) (1762) (emphasis added). Similarly. Locke wnites:
In transgressing the Law of Nature, the Offender declares himself to live by another Rule. than
that of reason and common Equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of Men.
for their mutual security: and so he becomes dangerous to Mankind. the lye, which is to secure
them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him.
LOCKE, supra note 163, at 272.
165. See, e.g., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790. 796 (1871) ("[Dlunng his term of
service in the penitentiary, [a prisoner] is in a state of penal servitude to the State.. He is for the time
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While "[1lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights,"'166 a prisoner today "retains all the
rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary
implication, taken from him by law."' 167
Courts, therefore, have settled on what Foucault calls a "principle of
moderation" to prevent the application of social contract theory to its full
extreme. 68 Yet Foucault's critique of the theory is still valid and the
privileging of the exclusionary impulse over toleration remains evident. First,
there is still "an unequal struggle: on one side are all the forces, all the power,
all the rights."'169 It is only in its beneficence that the state grants the
offender any rights; the state is depicted as generous rather than cruel and all
ambivalence is removed from the exercise of its power. Second, society still
places full blame on the individual, shielding itself from a reconsideration of
its own norms and laws; "the defense of society"170 justifies excluding
criminals or treating criminality as a form of dissonance rather than answering
to it. Finally, while the "offender" no longer loses all rights guaranteed by the
"contract," he does lose the right that is fundamentally connected to his equal
membership in society, the vote. Perhaps it is to close the circle on the
depoliticization of crime and the criminal, that once crime is depoliticized by
placing blame fully on the individual, society also seeks to depoliticize the
criminal himself.
In emphasizing the deliberate nature of a criminal action, social contract
theory points implicitly to the character of the criminal as its justification for
disenfranchisement. As in Rawls's justification of punishment, once the
individual has committed a crime, it is his or her character which becomes the
matter of juridical concern. If this connection is only implicit in contract
theory, it is made thoroughly explicit in republicanism, the basis for the second
justification of disenfranchisement.17' No longer is focus even said to be on
the criminal's action; it is unambivalently directed at his or her nature.
Rawls's explanation in Political Liberalism of civic republicanism (or
classical republicanism, as it is sometimes called) is sufficient for the current
being the slave of the State."). In at least one instance, disenfranchisement was (unsuccessfully) challenged
as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment on the theory that imprisonment was a "'previous condition of
servitude."' See People v. DeStefano, 212 N.E.2d 357, 361 (11. App. Ct. 1965) (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. XV).
166. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
167. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944).
168. See FOUCAULT, supra note 92, at 90; cf text accompanying notes 92-93.
169. FOUCAULT, supra note 92, at 90.
170. Id.
171. The line between social contract theory and republicanism is in fact not so clear. Rawls himself
writes that "justice as fairness as a form of political liberalism has no fundamental opposition" to civic
republicanism. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 205. Civic republicanism simply renders
the exclusionary tendency in liberalism even more explicit. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE
L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988) (arguing that republicanism is tainted with "legacy of excluding from the political
community all those whose voices would ... threaten disruption of a community's normative unity").
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analysis: It is, he writes, "the view that if the citizens of a democratic society
are to preserve their basic rights and liberties ... they must also have to a
sufficient degree the 'political virtues' . . . and be willing to take part in public
life." 72 Emphasis, therefore, is placed on the moral character of citizens;
actions are relevant insofar as they reveal the content of character. Ex-
offenders lose the right to participate, according to this view, because they
have shown themselves to lack the political virtues on which the stability and
welfare of a just order depends. A criminal act is taken to be, in Rawls's
words, "a mark of bad character."'
173
As with justice as fairness and social contract theory generally, civic
republicanism functions to convert dissonance from an institutional, political
problem to an individual, psychological problem. It remains, in Foucault's
words, "an unequal struggle," and attention is still focused entirely on the
dissonant individual. As in Rawls's scheme, this closure begs an important
question: Is society so insecure about its own stability or that of its laws and
norms that it must oppose in its entirety and with all of its power one lone
individual?' 74 The legal opinions on disenfranchisement that rely on civic
republicanism implicitly suggest that this is the case. For instance, in a widely
cited decision on disenfranchisement, Washington v. State,' the court ruled:
The manifest purpose is to preserve the purity of the ballot box,
which is the sure foundation of republican liberty, and which needs
protection against the invasion of corruption, just as much as against
that of ignorance, incapacity, or tyranny. The evil infection of the one
is not more fatal than that of the other. The presumption is, that one
rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense
indicative of great moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of
suffrage, or to hold office, upon terms of equality with freemen who
are clothed by the State with the toga of political citizenship. It is
proper, therefore, that this class should be denied a right, the exercise
of which might sometimes hazard the welfare of communities, if not
that of the State itself, at least in close political contests. The
exclusion ... [is] imposed for protection, and not for
punishment ....176
The focus here is not simply on the individual's lack of requisite moral
fortitude, but on the potential for this lack of moral fortitude to spread to
others, like an "evil infection." Criminality, like disease, the court seems to
172. RAwLs, POLMCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 205. Rawls defines the political v.irtues as "the
virtues of fair social cooperation such as the virtues of civility and tolerance. of reasonableness and the
sense of fairness." Id. at 194.
173. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9. at 315
174. See supra note 103.
175. 75 Ala. 582 (1884).
176. Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
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say, must be contained so as to prevent contagion. It is probably not
coincidental that Rawls invokes the same image of spreading disease in
discussing those with unreasonable comprehensive doctrines.' 77 The fear of
sickness in both cases betrays a certain frailty or insecurity of the social
body.t7 8 In Rawls's case-where the argument rests on the assertion that
everyone should find compliance with the two principles reasonable-this
insecurity is particularly ironic.
C. The Politics of Political Illiberalism
Whether or not they are rooted in a similar insecurity, it is clear that the
justification for disenfranchisement and Rawls's reliance on punishment as a
stabilizing device both follow from the impulse to protect society's standards
from contestation. 79 In Rawls's case, one's ability to contest society's
standards is closed off by the imposition of the label "unreasonable"; in the
case of disenfranchisement, this labeling is complemented by the explicit loss
of one's political status. The criminal, in each instance, is created as the
"other" to ward off the potential contestation of society's norms. 80 For
Rawls, the assumption of strict compliance and the emphasis on consensus lead
citizens of his well-ordered society to view the criminal as a "bad character"
deserving of punishment, even if such punishment is illiberal from the
standpoint of justice itself. With disenfranchisement, the act of creation is even
clearer: The revocation of the right to vote itself differentiates the criminal as
abnormal-it is a permanent mark of a lower status. "The process of making
the criminal," Frank Tannenbaum writes, "is a process of tagging, defining,
identifying, segregating, describing, emphasizing, making conscious and self-
conscious; it becomes a way of stimulating, suggesting, emphasizing, and
evoking the very traits that are complained of.'' The emphasis on the
177. See supra text accompanying note 80.
178. The origin of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that there is a strong connection
between the practice of disenfranchisement and feelings of insecurity on the part of the body politic; after
all, it was passed in the wake of America's most profound domestic crisis, the Civil War.
179. In recognizing that both the opinions on disenfranchisement and liberal theory function to protect
society's standards from contestation, my argument differs dramatically from that in the Note cited above.
See Note, supra note 12. Its author makes similar observations to mine about the "true impulse" behind
disenfranchisement. But the author fails to recognize that the exclusionary impulse afflicts liberal theory
as well. In fact, the author cites Rawls in arguing that disenfranchisement runs counter to liberal principles.
See id. at 1306. But see id. at 1306 n.35 (noting Rawls's reference to "certain generally recognized
exceptions" to universal suffrage discussed supra in note 109). In essence, the author does what I have
argued liberalism itself does: displace blame for the "dissonance" of disenfranchisement onto the practice
itself, shielding liberalism from blame. My argument is that the existence of disenfranchisement stems from
a problem immanent to liberalism, from an ambivalence in the theory itself.
180. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Richardson, came close to recognizing the depoliticizing
implications of disenfranchisement when he wrote: "The ballot is the democratic system's coin of the realm.
To condition its exercise on support of the established order is to debase that currency beyond recognition."
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 83 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
181. FRANK TANNENBAUM, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY 19-20 (1938).
1226 [Vol. 106: 1197
Political Illiberalism
individual nature of the criminal's act or character makes it appear as if the
criminal brings this process and the resulting lower status on himself, but
society imposes it, acting to prevent a threat to the maintenance of its
established standards.1
8 2
In assigning to the criminal an identity whose nature sets him apart from
the rest of society, the justificatory arguments for disenfranchisement, like
those for justice as fairness, license treatment that is otherwise inconsistent
with liberal principles. This explains how the practice of disenfranchisement
has persisted despite its fundamental inconsistency with one of the main
elements of American political and legal discourse: the defense of basic
liberties generally and political liberties particularly. By isolating the blame for
dissonance on the individual, society signals that the criminal deserves his fate,
if not wills it upon himself; as a result, it matters little that his punishment
may be illiberal from the standpoint of justice.1 3 Since the citizens on whom
such punishment is inflicted are defined as abnormal, the inconsistency
between their treatment and society's larger principle of toleration is not
perceived to undermine the liberal bases of mutual respect. In fact, as the
paradox of disenfranchisement reveals, the inconsistency is often not perceived
at all.
As Part I of this Note indicated, Rawls is relatively unaware of the
implications of treating dissonance as a purely individual problem-in
particular, of the potential for illiberal practices like disenfranchisement to be
justified within an otherwise liberal order. In discussing the content of a "fully
adequate scheme" of basic liberties, however, he does illustrate clearly what
the consequences of such practices are for liberalism as a whole:
If the equal basic liberties of some are restricted or denied, social
cooperation on the basis of mutual respect is impossible. For we saw
that fair terms of social cooperation are terms upon which as equal
182. As if the connection between disenfranchisement and the defense of socicty's norms were not
clear enough, the earliest Supreme Court decisions on disenfranchisement appealed directly to a threat
against society's moral standards. See Davis v. Beason. 133 U.S. 333. 341 (1890) (upholding
disenfranchisement for violation of laws against bigamy and polygamy because "[io extend exemption
from punishment for such crimes would be to shock the moral judgment of the community"). Murphy v
Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15. 45 (1885) (describing mamage as "best guaranty of that rccrent morality which is
the source of all beneficient progress in social and political improvement" in upholding disenfranchisement
for bigamy and polygamy).
183. As I have argued repeatedly in this Note. the displacement of blame presents introspection on
the part of society into the cause of dissonance or the justifiability of its exercises of power This dynamic
can be seen in society's general response to crime. As William Connolly notes. the spread of crime in
America rarely provokes introspection or arguments for the reform of society's institutions" "Rather. it
constantly renews the cry for law and order, or, when that cycle has exhausted itself, for the rehabilitation
of delinquents." William E. Connolly. Discipline, Polrics and Ambtgutty. I I POL TiIEORy 325. 332 (1983)
An ambivalence similar to the one I have discussed in the paradox of disenfranchisement, between
toleration and exclusion, can also be seen in the recent welfare reform act. particularly in its provisions
taking away benefits from legal immigrants. See Personal Responsibility and work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-193. §§ 400-51. 110 Stat 2105. 2260-77
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persons we are willing to cooperate with all members of society over
a complete life. When fair terms are not honored, those mistreated
will feel resentment or humiliation, and those who benefit must either
recognize their fault and be troubled by it, or else regard those
mistreated as deserving their loss. On both sides, the conditions of
mutual respect are undermined.'84
This is certainly true of disenfranchisement: Society regards those mistreated
as deserving their loss and thus remains untroubled. It is also true of
punishment in justice as fairness, where criminals' "nature is their
misfortune."' 85 The problem is not that Rawls is oblivious to the fact that
illiberal treatment undermines the conditions of mutual respect; it is that he
fails to generalize this realization to include all society. The same can be said
of American legal discourse and its gradual expansion to include almost
everyone. It seems as if American democracy, like justice as fairness, is
liberal-but only to a point.
III. FROM CONSENSUS TO TOLERATION: LIBERALISM RECONFIGURED
How, then, is it possible to secure the conditions of mutual respect, so that
political liberalism can be liberal and nothing else? As I have hinted
throughout this Note, I believe the solution to this question lies in the aspect
of the reasonable that is disfavored by both Rawls's theory and American
criminal law: the second aspect, which favors toleration rather than
consensus.186 In essence, I have argued that the way in which the idea of the
reasonable is understood and employed, in both settings, is itself unreasonable.
It forms the basis of an unreasonable belief that those who fail to comply with
society's principles of justice need not be addressed as equal citizens worthy
of respect; that they can be punished or excluded to prevent them from posing
a threat to the stability of the order. The task, therefore, is to alter the idea of
the reasonable specifically and liberalism generally-both Rawlsian and
American-so that toleration is the highest virtue. It is to apply the idea of the
reasonable to the reasonable itself.1
8 7
Focusing for the moment on justice as fairness, I believe this task would
call for at least two adjustments. First, it would require that one shift emphasis
from the first aspect of the reasonable, the willingness to propose principles to
which all can agree, to the second, the willingness to recognize the burdens of
184. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 337-38 (emphasis added).
185. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 576 (emphasis added).
186. American legal discourse, obviously, does not rely explicitly on the so-called second aspect of
the reasonable; as I have attempted to show, however, the two aspects of the reasonable are implicit in this
discourse.
187. Cf RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 9, at 10 (describing task as "appl[ying] the
principle of toleration to philosophy itself"). I am indebted to David Peritz for suggesting this phrase.
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judgment, so as to halt the first aspect in its consensual drift. For it is only
when the first aspect of the reasonable is understood to license enforcement of
consensus that it becomes unreasonable. The roles of each aspect in the
normative theory would remain the same: The first would still inform the
selection of principles while the second would specify the limits to this
selection; these limits, however, would be much more heavily emphasized.
Next, the second aspect of the reasonable, the willingness to recognize the
burdens of judgment, would need to be supplemented with a willingness to
recognize the "fact of dissonance" as well: the fact that some individuals will
simply not "fit," that some degree of crime or dissonance will exist regardless
of the reasonableness of society's institutions.
These alterations would no doubt require changes in Rawls's normative
theory itself. While I am not prepared to trace the consequences of these
changes throughout the theory, I would suggest preliminarily that both the
assumption of strict compliance and the requirement of unanimity would need
to be removed from the constitutional and legislative stages of the four-stage
sequence. 8' Abandoning these conditions would dramatically alter the
perception of those in the constitutional and legislative stages of Rawls's ideal
society. They could no longer presume the possibility of a well-ordered
society, as Rawls defines it, and they would structure their expectations and
institutions accordingly. The concept of a well-ordered society, therefore,
would no longer be strictly ideal: Dissonance and crime would not be
eliminated altogether, but would be maintained at an acceptably low level. This
is not to say that participants in these stages would view dissonance or crime
as reasonable, as surely most dissonance and crime is not; rather, they would
view the drive to eliminate entirely all crime and dissonance from society as
an exercise of power that is itself unreasonable." 9
188. It is beyond the scope of this Note to argue that Rawls's theory could sustain these changes.
although I believe it could. It suffices here only to suggest a direction in uhich one might take Rawls's
theory in order to address the problems analyzed in Pan I.
I should note, in addition, that I do not think that the changes for which I hase argued in the idea of
the reasonable would necessitate a major revision of the original position itself, or of its outcome (it c. the
two principles of justice as fairness discussed supra in note 21). The purpose of the original position %ould
remain the selection of principles that are "reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore justifiable
to them." RAwLS, POLMCAL LIBERAUSM, supra note 9, at 49. The changes would, however, require Ravls
to be more sensitive to the roles that ideal and nonideal theory play in his overall argument, this is more
appropriately done in the constitutional and legislative stages.
189. Introducing the fact of dissonance into the constitutional and legislative stages of Rawls's
argument, where the veil of ignorance is thinner but still present, would require the parties to engage in
a process of self-reflection that would likely result in the elimination of such illiberal practices as
disenfranchisement. The parties, authors of the criminal law, would know that cnme is inevitable in any
society, no matter how well-ordered, but would not know whether upon lifting the veil of ignorance they
would be criminals, victims, or unaffected by crime. The structure of the theory would allow, for
consideration, not only of those who inevitably fail to "'fit," but also of those harmed by such dissonant
individuals, thus giving full meaning to the idea of reciprocity in justice as fairness. See supra text
accompanying note 184. It would force the parties to consider what some theorists have called "'the other"
See, e.g., William Connolly, The Dilemma of Legitimacy, in LEGMMACY AND "itE STATE 222. 241
(William Connolly ed., 1984) ("The quest for legitimacy must open itself to the voice of the other. it must
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The main point is that the knowledge required to construct an actual ideal
society is different from that which Rawls grants the participants in the
constitutional and legislative stages-not to mention different from that which
motivates actual policymakers and jurists. A realization that a certain level of
crime is simply ineliminable, even in a society which is as just as it can
possibly be, requires a dramatic alteration of expectations. Emile Durkheim
makes a similar point in The Rules of Sociological Method when he writes that
"there is no phenomenon which represents more incontrovertibly all the
symptoms of normality" than crime.19° "[Slince there cannot be a society in
which individuals do not diverge to some extent from the collective type," he
explains, "it is also inevitable that among these deviations some assume a
criminal character."' 9' Crime, Durkheim argues, is the necessary corollary
of freedom:
For [moral consciousness] to evolve, individual originality must be
allowed to manifest itself. But so that the originality of the idealist
who dreams of transcending his era may display itself, that of the
criminal, which falls short of the age, must also be possible. One does
not go without the other.' 9
If Durkheim's analysis is correct, as I believe the fact of dissonance suggests,
then the only realizable just society is one with an ineliminable level of
criminality. To eliminate criminality altogether would entail a power
"unparalleled in history."'93
These observations present major problems for Rawls's exclusive focus on
ideal theory, exposing its fundamental flaw: its assumption that a society
without crime is not only realistic, but reasonable or desirable. Durkheim's
observations present a similar challenge to American criminal jurisprudence
with its underlying assumption that criminality is an abnormal condition that
must be contained. "[C]rime must no longer be conceived of as an evil which
cannot be circumscribed closely enough," Durkheim writes. "Far from there
being cause for congratulation when it drops too noticeably below the normal
level, this apparent progress assuredly coincides with and is linked to some
review itself from the vantage point of conceptualizations it finds alien, questions it tends to ignore, and
answers it tends to exclude.").
190. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 98 (Steven Lukes ed. & W.D. Halls
trans., 1982) (1938) (hereinafter DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD]. I do not wish to
suggest that I am in agreement with Durkheim's analyses of crime and punishment as a whole, His
argument that punishment serves a positive function as an "integrating element" reinforcing society's moral
consciousness is clearly inconsistent with my approach in this Note. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION
OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 57 (W.D. Halls trans., 1984) (1933). I seek instead to differentiate Durkheim's view
of the functionality of punishment, with which I disagree, from his analysis that suggests crime is an
ineliminable component of any society, with which I agree.
191. DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD, supra note 190, at 101 (emphasis added).
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. Id. Durkheim uses the term "collective sentiments" instead of "power." Id.
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social disturbance."' 9 Far from being viewed as "an utterly unsociable
creature, a sort of parasitic element, a foreign, unassimilable body introduced
into the bosom of society," as the criminal is in Rawls's theory and in
American criminal law, the criminal "plays a normal role in social life."'- 5
The existence of a certain level of crime, therefore, should not be treated
as a phenomenon to be cured; rather, it should be viewed as the sign of a
healthy, well-ordered society with a degree of laxity in its social life and
norms. No longer should criminals be told that their nature is their only
misfortune or that they are like a sickness that needs be cured; in addition,
they should be told that society's norms contribute to their misfortune. Their
assumptions suitably adjusted, the "reasonable" citizens of justice as fairness
and the jurists who shape American law would be forced to acknowledge the
responsibility to reflect on their own norms-the responsibility to reevaluate
the reasonableness of those norms, not simply to evoke them or to defend them
mindlessly. Until this happens, liberalism will remain illiberal, and addressing
the true sources of crime and dissonance will remain an unrealizable goal.
194. Id. at 102. Conversely, when the incidence of crime or punishment nses abo~e a "'normal-
levelA-when, for example, one in three black men between the ages of 20 and 29 is either in prison or jail.
on probation, or on parole, see MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING. THE SE'TE.NCING PROJECT. YOUNG
BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMI: FIVE YEARS LATER I (1995)-society should
not escape serious reflection on its own norms by displacing all blame for dissonance onto the individual.
195. DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD, supra note 190, at 102.
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